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How fast can traders add and multiply? 




This paper studies an episode of dissemination of wrong stock index values in real time 
due to a software bug in the Indian Nifty index futures market on the morning of January 
18, 2006.  
The  episode  provides  an  opportunity  to  test  various  models  of  cognitive  biases  and 
bounded  rationality  highlighted  in  behavioural  finance.  The  paper  provides  strong 
evidence  against  cognitive  biases  like  “anchoring  and  adjustment”  (Tversky  and 
Kahneman, 1974) that one might expect under such situations even though the cognitive 
task involved is quite simple. The futures market tracked the true Nifty index which it 
could not see while completely ignoring the wrong Nifty index that it could see. 
However, the paper demonstrates that market efficiency failed in more subtle ways. There 
is  evidence  of  a  partial  breakdown  of  price  discovery  in  the  futures  markets  and  a 
weakening of the bonds linking futures and cash markets.  
This evidence is consistent with the centrality of “market devices” as argued in “actor 
network theory” in economic sociology (Muniesa, Millo and Callon, 2007 and Preda, 
2006). Well functioning markets today depend critically on a whole set of information and 
communication technologies. Any failures in these material, socio-technical aspects of 
markets can make markets quite fragile even if behavioural biases are largely absent.  
                                                 
1 Professor, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India  
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I have benefitted from discussions with several market participants, analysts and experts 
on  the  episode  studied  in  this  paper.  In  particular,  I  would  like  to  acknowledge  the 
following  persons  who  contributed  significantly  to  my  understanding  of  the  issues 
involved: 
·  Mr. Vineet Bhatnagar, Managing Director and CEO, MF Global-Sify Securities 
India Pvt. Ltd., a large derivative broking firm in India, provided me with valuable 
insights based on his ringside view of the events studied in the paper, and clarified 
several of my doubts about the behaviour of market participants on that day. 
·  Mr. Ashish Chauhan, currently Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Bombay 
Stock Exchange, was at the time of the event the Group Chief Information Officer 
of the Reliance Group and was intimately involved in the demerger of the 
Reliance group. It was an error in correctly accounting for this demerger that led 
to the wrong dissemination of the Nifty on January 16, 2006. Mr. Chauhan 
provided me a very important corporate perspective on the event, and also shared 
his knowledge of how market participants and other stakeholders reacted to the 
error. 
·  Ms. Latha Venkatesh, Banking Editor, CNBC TV-18 – one of India’s leading 
business television channels – provided me with archival videos of the live 
commentary on this channel of the first hour of trading on January 16, 2006. I 
would like to thank CNBC-TV18 for these videos which were very helpful in 
reconstructing how analysts and participants processed the information relating to 
the error in real time. Live telecasts are perhaps the only source that is completely 
free from hindsight bias. 
·  My colleague, Prof. Joshy Jacob, at the Indian Institute of Management, provided 
valuable comments on an initial draft of this paper and suggested several ways of 
improving it. 
Needless to say, any errors in interpretation and analysis are my own. 
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When index dissemination goes wrong: 
How fast can traders add and multiply
2? 
Jayanth R. Varma (jrvarma@iimahd.ernet.in)  
The wrong dissemination episode of January 18, 2006 
As part of a settlement process mutually agreed upon after a year-long ownership 
dispute between the Ambani brothers, a demerger scheme was carried out in 2006 to 
hive off the interests of Reliance Industries Limited in power, telecom and finance to 
a new group started by the younger brother Anil Ambani. After demerger, Reliance 
Industries under Mukesh Ambani, the elder brother, was focused  on petrochemicals, 
refinery and oil and gas exploration. Reliance Industries Limited was part of the Nifty 
index which is the dominant index in India’s index futures market. 
On January 18, 2006, the National Stock Exchange (NSE) organized an hour-long 
special  trading  session  between  8  am  and  9  am  to  value  the  demerged  Reliance 
Industries.  Based on the price discovered in the special session, adjustments were 
suitably carried out to the base index value to compute the index value so as to give 
effect to the demerger.  The market then opened as per normal market timings. 
The NSE describes what happened thereafter as follows (National Stock Exchange, 
2006): 
“The market opened and the correct adjusted index value of NIFTY was also 
displayed to the market at the opening trade. The activity of NIFTY index 
computation was closely monitored after market opening and it was seen that 
the first few NIFTY index values were computed correctly taking into account 
the adjusted base index value. However once the first trade in Reliance 
Industries Ltd. was executed, it was observed that the NIFTY Index reflected 
incorrect value. The problem was analysed and found that due to memory 
initialization failure the last traded price being reckoned for index computation 
purpose was carrying an incorrect value. This resulted in a wrong NIFTY 
index value being displayed. The problem was identified and changes were 
carried out to reflect the correct value of the NIFTY index. The NIFTY index 
dissemination was stopped at 10.30 am and the correct display of NIFTY 
index value was made available to the market from 10.56 am onwards. The 
other indices remained unaffected.” 
The NSE went on to assert: “The prices of NIFTY contracts  continued  to  be  at  
market    during    the    period    when    the    NIFTY    index    value  was  incorrectly 
disseminated as can be seen from the graph enclosed.” 
                                                 
2 The second part of the title is inspired by section 4.3.3 on “How fast can we multiply?” in 
Donald Knuth’s celebrated book: Knuth, D. E. (1998) The Art of Computer Programming, 
Volume 2: Seminumerical Algorithms, Addison Wesley.  
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Figure 1: Graph of wrongly disseminated Nifty Index values and Futures prices 
published by NSE to support its claim that the prices of Nifty futures contracts  
continued  to  be  at  market  when  the  Nifty  index  value was incorrectly 
disseminated. 
 
The graph does provide tentative support for the claim that the wrong index values did 
not fool the market. But a graph is useless for any rigorous analysis of what happened 
in the interconnected market for cash equities and index futures.  
Data and sampling 
To carry out a proper econometric analysis, I worked with intra-day (tick by tick) 
values of the Nifty index and futures contract extracted from the data disks published 
by  the  NSE.  I  was  not  able  to  obtain  the  data  on  the  wrong  values  that  were 
disseminated on January 18, 2006: the NSE stated in an email that the wrong data 
does not appear to have been stored.  I obtained values for this series by digitizing
3 
the graph in Figure 1.  
                                                 
3 I used the open source Engauge Digitizer available at http://digitizer.sourgeforge.net  
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For  the  purpose  of  econometric  analysis,  all  the  time  series  were  sampled  at  a 
frequency of one minute by averaging the values during each minute. The resulting 
data for all the three series obtained from these two sources is plotted in Figure 2. The 
intra-minute spikes in the wrong Nifty around 9:55 am and 10:00 am in Figure 1 are 
reduced  by  one-minute  averaging  (though  the  digitization  process  itself  preserved 
these spikes). Apart from these intra-minute spikes, the plot of the wrong Nifty in 
Figure 2 closely follows the plot of the same series in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 2: Futures price, Nifty index values on 17 and 18 January and wrong 
index values disseminated on 18 January. The plot is based on data sampled (by 
averaging) at one minute frequency.  
 
What happened in the first one minute? 
Before turning to the econometrics using sampled data, it is useful to look at the full 
tick by tick data during the first one minute of trading on January 18, 2006. In the 
space of about half a minute, the disseminated wrong Nifty plummeted almost 90 
points from its opening level of around 2829 to the first minute low of around 2742. 
During this period, the difference between the open and the first minute low for the  
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true Nifty and the futures price was well below one-tenth of the drop in the wrong 
Nifty – a mere 5 or 6 points. 
Instrument  No of 
trades 
Open  High  Low  Close  Mean 








This implies that there was probably not even a single trade of the Nifty futures that 
was swayed by the wrong Nifty values. For a contract with a traded value of Rs 899 
million during this first minute at an average of 10 trades a second, this is surprisingly 
strong evidence in favour of market efficiency. 
It is difficult to believe that the market took only a fraction of a second to figure out 
that the disseminated Nifty values were wrong. It is more plausible that the market 
took a few seconds to figure this out, but in the absence of algorithmic high frequency 
trading in the Indian market at that time, it would have taken several seconds for 
traders to place new orders into the system. Within these few seconds, they might 
have figured out the error. 
The first five minutes 
I watched archival videos of the live commentary on the market from one of India’s 
leading business channels – CNBC TV18 – to get a better understanding of what 
happened in the first five minutes of trading. 
Just before trading began in the Indian markets on January 18, 2006, the channel 
presented  news  from  other  Asian  markets.  Japan  (Nikkei)  was  down  3.26%, 
Singapore (Strait Times) was down 0.72%, Korea (KOSPI) was down 3.74% and 
Taiwan was down 3.19%.  As the anchor
4 said “I don’t want to spook you early in the 
morning, but that is reality staring at you. Asian markets are taking it in the neck.” 
The Indian market was also expected to open lower, but losses were expected to be 
much lower than in the exporting powerhouses of East Asia. There were also some 
good corporate results to perk up the market.  
It is common for the Indian market to move significantly at the open in response to 
overnight news flow from the US and from Asian markets. The standard deviation of 
price  changes  at  the  open  (from  the  previous  day’s  close)  during  the  one  year 
preceding January 18, 2006 was 0.24%. This was dwarfed by the standard deviation 
of  1.04%  for  price  changes  from  the  open  to  the  same  day’s  close.  For  another 
comparison, on the previous day (January 17, 2006), the standard deviation of price 
changes during one minute of trading was 0.04%. 
At the opening bell at 9:55 am on January 18, 2006, the prices of actively traded 
stocks started flashing across the screen on CNBC-TV18. About half a minute after 
                                                 
4 The anchor was Mr. Udayan Mukherjee, Managing Editor of CNBC-TV18.  
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the opening bell, the indices started appearing on the screen. First up was the 30 share 
BSE Sensex which like the Dow Jones Index in the US is widely followed though it is 
not the index on which the main derivative market is based.  
The  screen shows “Sensex 9293.80  ▼20.33 -0.22%”  and  the anchor explains the 
action: “Sensex has opened 20 odd points down. Something tells me it should have 
fallen  more.”    Next  comes  the  Nifty;  the  screen  shows  “Nifty  2757.60 
▼71.50 -2.53%.” The anchor is shocked: “Nifty has fallen 71 points at 2757. Two 
and a half percent! What is happening there? There is a disconnect there for sure.”  
The channel then turns to some of the leading stocks (most are down modestly) and 
then to the Sensex which by now has slipped 42 points. The screen shows “Sensex 
9271.51 ▼42.62 -0.46%.” It is now almost one minute after the opening bell, and the 
anchor returns to the unexplained fall in the Nifty:  
“What could have knocked off? Is it an error in calculation? I imagine it is. 
Because Nifty has fallen 80 points, that is three percent while Sensex is down 
half a percent, and nothing seems to have collapsed that much for the Nifty. I 
don’t know. Reliance is at 708, that has not fallen so much and it is adjusted. So 
it would not have affected the index. Is it a wrong calculation on the screen out 
here? The Sensex is down 41, that is more like it. And the Nifty is showing you 
87 points down. I imagine that could be a bit of an error out there in calculation.” 
The anchor then points out that a few stocks have fallen a couple of percentage points, 
but there is nothing to suggest a 3% fall in the index. About one and a half minutes 
after the opening bell (or about a minute after the first Nifty quote appeared on the TV 
screen) the anchor concludes: “I don’t know what is happening there.”  
During the next half a minute, the anchor keeps coming back to the Nifty problem:  
“Still intrigued by the three percent fall in the Nifty. I don’t know whether the 
wires are making some kind of error or is this coming from the exchanges. We 
will run a check on that very soon and tell you.” 
“There is nothing in the Nifty to suggest a three percent fall unless they are 
calculating the entire Reliance fall and that is getting translated into the Nifty 
which is a possibility and which would be an error in this case, but I am not too 
sure about that. We will get a check going.” 
About three minutes and twenty seconds after the opening bell, the channel starts 
flashing its estimate of the Nifty (2829.10) on the screen. During the space of one 
minute, the channel flashes this “alert” four times with the same value of 2829.10. 
Clearly, the channel has been able to make some kind of computation of the Nifty 
index, but has not been able to keep updating its computation in real time.  
Nearly five minutes after the opening bell, the anchor warns the viewers not to go by 
the official Nifty numbers: “But the Nifty is not down too much. In fact, the current 
rate is closer to 2830 – 2820 types and not the 2742 that you see on the screen at all.” 
The anchor’s caution in giving a range instead of a single number is very prudent – 
according to the corrected index published later by the exchange, the correct value of 
the Nifty at that time was closer to 2810.  
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About five and a half minutes after the opening bell, the channel interviews a trader 
who says that on his trading screen also both the Nifty and the Defty (the US dollar 
version  of  the  Nifty)  are  showing  the  wrong  numbers  and  conjectures  that  the 
calculation mistake is related to the Reliance demerger. 
After that, CNBC TV-18 chose to focus on the Sensex value as the indicator of the 
broader market, and more or less ignored the Nifty apart from an occasional flash 
about a calculation error in the Nifty. Those trading Nifty futures of course did not 
have the option of ignoring the Nifty in this manner. 
What determined futures prices on the 18
th morning? 
I have already presented the analysis based on tick by tick data to show the level of 
the wrong Nifty index had no impact on the market. We now ask whether the market 
did look at the changes in the disseminated Nifty rather than its absolute level after 
figuring out that the level of the disseminated Nifty was wrong.   
Using the minute-by minute data
5, I regress the Nifty futures returns
6 on returns in the 
wrong Nifty and returns in the true Nifty to obtain the following result:  
Table 1:  Regression of Futures returns on wrong Nifty returns and true Nifty 
returns during the period when true Nifty was not available. The market 
appears to track the true Nifty which it could not see while ignoring the wrong 
Nifty that it could see. 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
Constant  3.875e-05  6.158e-05  0.629  0.532   
True Nifty Returns  7.163e-01  7.800e-02  9.183  5.67e-13  *** 
Wrong Nifty Returns  -6.048e-02  5.955e-02  -1.016  0.314   
R-squared: 0.6079, F-statistic: 45.74 on 2 and 59 DF,  p-value: 1.009e-12 
 
Clearly, the futures returns are strongly related to the returns on the true Nifty – the 
coefficient value of 0.7163 is economically quite large (not that far from unity) and 
the t-statistic of 9.183 is highly significant. However the futures market completely 
ignored  what  was  happening  to  the  disseminated  (wrong)  Nifty  values  –  the 
coefficient value of -0.0605 is of the wrong sign, is economically quite small and is 
also statistically insignificant.  
This  is  a  surprisingly  strong  finding  in  favour  of  market  efficiency.  The  futures 
market appears to track the true Nifty which it could not see while ignoring the wrong 
Nifty that it could see. 
                                                 
5 To avoid the results being distorted by the huge negative return in the wrong Nifty at the 
beginning of the day, I drop the first two minutes of data in all my analysis. This is simpler 
and probably more effective than using a bounded influence regression estimate. 
6 An additional reason for carrying out the regression using returns and not levels is that as 
discussed later in the paper, I am not able to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the futures 
prices and in the index.   
 
IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
W.P.  No.  2010-08-04  Page No. 10 
Of course the regression tells us nothing about the direction of causality: 
·  The futures market could have been estimating the true Nifty values without the 
benefit of the real time feed. 
·  The cash market might have been following the movement in the futures market. 
Bhatia (2007) provides evidence that the Nifty futures market leads the cash 
market. 
Anchoring and adjustment 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe the phenomenon of anchoring and adjustment 
as follows: 
“In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that 
is adjusted to yield the final answer.  The initial value, or starting point, may be 
suggested by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial 
computation.  In either case, adjustments are typically insufficient.  That is, 
different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the 
initial values.” 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) point out that this phenomenon is observed even when 
the initial anchor is a random number obtained by spinning a wheel. It is natural then 
to assume that the wrongly disseminated Nifty index which was so salient would have 
served as an initial anchor. With insufficient adjustment, clearly it should have had 
some impact on the price.  
The empirical evidence strongly rejects the theory of anchoring and adjustment. The 
disseminated wrong Nifty had no impact on futures prices either in terms of levels or 
in terms of returns. The evidence is strongly in favour of an efficient market and 
strongly against behavioural biases like anchoring and adjustment
7. 
The  data  lends  support  to  the  view  that  some  of  the  behavioural  biases  that  are 
observed in laboratory setting do not occur in the context of structured and scaffolded 
decision situations that prevail in market settings. For example,  Clarke (1997) argues: 
“traditional economic theory (invoking the substantive rationality paradigm) succeeds 
wherever  individual  choice  is  strongly  constrained  by  social  and  institutional 
scaffolding that has itself evolved subject to selective pressures to maximize rewards. 
Outside such highly constrained settings, genuine individual thought plays a greater 
role, and the psychological irrealism of the substantive rationality model takes its 
toll.” 
More stringent tests of market efficiency 
What I have shown is that on the morning of January 18, the market passed some of 
the basic tests of market efficiency and avoided some of the pitfalls that behavioural 
finance warns us against. But the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) makes much 
                                                 
7 We could also perhaps interpret the evidence as being against the availability heuristic.  
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stronger  demands  on  the  market.  The  semi-strong  form  of  the  EMH  asserts  that 
market prices should reflect all published information.  
Though the true Nifty was not being disseminated, the prices of the underlying stocks 
were being disseminated. The composition of the index and the constituent weights 
were also publicly available. Theoretically, therefore, the true Nifty could have been 
computed  by  any  market  participant  with  fairly  rudimentary  software.  It  is  fairly 
straightforward
8 to  design  a  spreadsheet  that  takes  in  real  time  price  feeds  of 
individual stocks and computes the index. 
Strict  standards  of  market  efficiency  would  require  the  market  to  function  as 
effectively without the true Nifty feed as it does with it. A quick glance at Figure 3 
shows that this was not the case. It is visually evident that the relationship between 
true Nifty and Futures was much weaker when wrong Nifty was disseminated. The 
trend line through the scatter plot is much flatter during the period as compared to the 
approximately 45° line when the true Nifty was available.   
                                                 
8 I do not intend the term “straightforward” to suggest that trading-room-ready software could 
have been put in place very quickly. It is possible that starting from scratch, traders might not 
have been able to complete the development, complete testing and integration of this software 
during the one hour or so when the wrong Nifty was being disseminated.    
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Figure 3: Relationship between true Nifty and Futures was much weaker when 
wrong Nifty was disseminated. The relationship does not appear to be different 
between the two days or between different times of the day. 
 
The  evidence  is  visually  compelling,  and  would  evidently  be  statistically  highly 
significant
9,  but  there  is  a  serious  econometric  issue  about  stationarity  and  co-
integration to be addressed. A regression in levels between the futures price and the 
Nifty index is permissible only if the two variables are co-integrated.  Bhatia (2007) 
provides  evidence of co-integration between the futures  and  the  index, but  in the 
shorter data that I am using here, I am not able to establish co-integration: 
                                                 
9 The Chow test results are:  F-statistic: 213.17 on 2 and 666 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16  
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·  It is not possible to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the difference
10 between 
the futures price and the Nifty index at even the 10% level using either the ADF or 
the PP test. 
·  The above test assumes a particular form (1, -1) for the co-integrating vector. I 
therefore tested for a general co-integrating vector using the Engle-Granger two 
step procedure. Again it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the 
first stage residuals at even the 10% level.  
In the absence of co-integration, it is necessary to carry out the analysis in terms of 
differences or percentage changes
11. A visual picture is provided in Figure 4 where it 
can be seen that the slope of the scatter diagram is somewhat flatter when the true 
Nifty is not available.  
More importantly, the contour plot of the two dimensional density estimate that is 
superimposed on the scatter diagram is very informative. When the true Nifty is not 
available, the innermost contour lines are almost circular indicating a near absence of 
a relationship between the Nifty and the futures when the changes in the true Nifty are 
small. It is only the outer contour lines that are elongated in the direction implying 
that it is only when there are large changes in the true Nifty that the relationship 
becomes somewhat stronger. 
This visual impression of an altered relation between the futures and the true index is 
confirmed by the regression results reported in Table 2. I regressed the returns in the 
futures on the returns in the true Nifty index separately for the periods when the true 
Nifty was disseminated and when it was not. I then tested for equality of the slopes 
using the Chow test. 
                                                 
10 The results are similar if the test is based on the percentage difference between the futures 
price and the index. 
11 The returns are indeed stationary. The hypothesis of a unit root is comfortably rejected at 
the 1% level in Nifty returns (PP-test statistic = -11.9556; ADF test statistic = -11.9556) and 
in futures returns (PP-test statistic = -17.9427; ADF test statistic = -15.3825).  
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Figure 4: The relationship between futures returns and Nifty returns is also 
weaker when the wrong Nifty was disseminated 
 
Table 2: The regression relationship between Futures returns and true Nifty 
returns changed when the true Nifty was not available. 
A. During the period when true Nifty was available 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
Constant  -1.975e-06  1.460e-05  -0.135  0.892   
True Nifty Returns  9.057e-01  3.816e-02  23.736  <2e-16  *** 
R-squared: 0.4826, F-statistic: 563.4 on 1 and 604 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
B. During the period when true Nifty was not available 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
Constant  3.683e-05  6.156e-05  0.598  0.552   
True Nifty Returns  6.861e-01  7.216e-02  9.508  1.39e-13  *** 
R-squared: 0.6011, F-statistic: 90.41 on 1 and 60 DF,  p-value: 1.391e-13 
Chow test for a change in slopes:  
F-statistic: 5.6227 on 2 and 664 DF, p-value: 0.003789 
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The relationship between the futures and true Nifty returns is significantly different 
when the true Nifty is not available. The coefficient is close to unity (0.9057) when 
the true Nifty is disseminated but drops sharply to 0.6861 when the wrong Nifty is 
disseminated. The Chow test shows that the difference in slopes is significant at the 
1% level. 
At the same time, the squared correlation is significantly higher when the wrong Nifty 
is disseminated. This apparently conflicting result is of course explained by the sharp 
differences in standard deviations: 
Period  Standard Deviation of 
Nifty Returns (x 10,000) 
Standard Deviation of 
Futures Returns (x 10,000) 
True Nifty available  3.83  4.99 
True Nifty not available  8.59  7.60 
Ratio between two periods  2.24  1.52 
 
It is tempting to imagine that the higher volatility is due only to the non availability of 
the Nifty. But this would be incorrect to for several reasons: 
·  Volatility is known to have a strong intra-day pattern (it is typically higher in the 
beginning of the day). 
·  The wrong dissemination happened on an unusual day where the market was trying 
to digest the implications of the price discovery that had taken place in the special 
session of the demerger of a large index constituent. 
I therefore prefer to focus on the change in the regression slope which I find deeply 
troubling. Normally, one would expect a coefficient close to unity between the index 
returns and the futures returns. The fact that the slope dropped well below unity when 
the true Nifty was not available is suggestive of a break down of price discovery. 
To investigate the matter more closely, I examined the response of futures prices to 
lagged changes in the percentage basis
12. Essentially the question that I am asking is: 
if  the  gap  between  the  index  and  the  futures  widens  over  this  minute,  does  this 
widening reverse over the next minute by an offsetting move in the index
13. It may be 
seen from Figure 5, that when the true Nifty is available, changes in the spot-futures 
basis tend to be reversed by an offsetting move in the index in the next minute. This 
does not happen when the wrong Nifty is disseminated (in fact, the scatter diagram 
has the wrong slope). This is indicative of a major break down of price discovery in 
the markets during this period. 
 
                                                 
12 The spot-futures basis is the difference between the index and the index futures. I focus on 
the basis in percentage terms. 
13 The reversal could happen through a move in either the futures or in the index. Since 
futures are known to contribute more to price discovery, one would expect the index to move 
to correct the basis. This is confirmed by regression results discussed later.  
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Figure 5: When the true Nifty is available, the Nifty moves to offset changes in 
the previous minute in the spot futures basis. This does not happen when the true 
Nifty is not available. 
 
To test this, statistically, I ran the regression reported in Table 3 where Nifty returns 
are regressed on futures returns and on changes in the lagged percentage basis. When 
the true index is available, the Nifty does offset lagged changes in the basis – the 
coefficient is negative and highly significant. When the wrong Nifty was disseminated, 
the coefficient is of the wrong sign and is not statistically significant.   
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Table 3: The index moves to offset changes in the lagged basis only when the true 
index is available 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)   
A. During the period when true Nifty was available 
Constant  -3.377e-06  1.100e-05  -0.307  0.759   
Futures Returns  5.101e-01  2.264e-02  22.526  <2e-16  *** 
Lagged changes in 
percentage basis  
-1.500e-01  3.130e-02  -4.792  2.08e-06  *** 
B. During the period when true Nifty was not available 
Constant  -2.993e-05  6.909e-05  -0.433  0.6664   
Futures Returns  8.477e-01  9.229e-02  9.185  6.57e-13  *** 
Lagged changes in 
percentage basis  
2.127e-01  1.265e-01  1.681  0.0981  . 
 
In regressions not reported here, futures returns were regressed on futures returns and 
on changes in the lagged percentage basis. In both time periods, the coefficient of the 
lagged change in the basis was not significant.  
The natural conclusion is that under normal conditions, significant price discovery 
takes place in the futures market, and the cash market adjusts with a lag. However, 
when the true Nifty is not available, the futures market is not able to perform this 
function. Price discovery is impeded in the futures market. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Even  in  the  absence  of  a  true  index  price  feed,  the  market  did  not  exhibit  the 
stupidities that behavioural finance models of anchoring and adjustment might have 
predicted. But the absence of the true price feed did make the market much less smart 
than normal.  
The good news is that even during the entire period of systems failure, the futures 
market tracked the true Nifty index which it could not see while completely ignoring 
the wrong Nifty index that it could see. The tick by tick data shows that the futures 
market  was  not  even  momentarily  deceived  by  the  wrong  Nifty  index  that  was 
disseminated. It is true that the cognitive task involved in index computation is quite 
simple, yet the evidence that markets can overcome cognitive biases is encouraging. 
However, price discovery failed in more subtle ways that are at variance with strict 
definitions of market efficiency. Under extreme standards of market efficiency, the 
index disseminated in real time by the exchange adds no new information as long as 
the prices of the underlying stocks are being disseminated and the composition of the 
index  and  the  constituent  weights  are  publicly  available.  According  to  strict 
interpretation of the semi-strong form of market efficiency, a failure of the real time 
index price feed should make no difference. 
It is true that the true Nifty could have been computed by any market participant using 
any standard spreadsheet software that has the capability to take in real time price 
feeds of individual stocks. If one imagines a world in which index futures are traded 
but nobody disseminates the index in real time, most market participants would build,  
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test and deploy their own software to perform this computation. But that is not the 
world in which we live. In the real world, the index is disseminated in real time by an 
authoritative source and therefore market participants have little incentive to build and 
deploy highly robust and reliable software to perform index computation.  
From  my  conversations  with  market  participants,  I  learnt  that  large  market 
participants  did  have  spreadsheets  to  compute  the  Nifty  index,  but  there  was 
unanimity that the confidence that they had in these spreadsheets was quite limited. 
The typical response was that such an excel sheet serves well as an information but 
traders will surely be hesitant to include its output for example for proprietary trades 
or even into algorithmic trading for their large institutional clients. Data feed from an 
exchange is considered as reliable by proprietary trading brokers and by algorithmic 
and high frequency trading clients.  
The video of the CNBC-TV18 live market commentary in the opening minutes of 
trading  also  leads  to  the  same  conclusion.  The  channel  is  able  to  say  quite 
categorically that the official Nifty is wrong, but it is rightly much less confident 
about its own estimate: “But the Nifty is not down too much. In fact, the current rate 
is closer to 2830 – 2820 types and not the 2742 that you see on the screen at all.” As 
already mentioned, with hindsight, we know that the correct Nifty at the time was 
closer to 2810.  
When the disseminated index has an error of about 2½%, even a crude computation 
with an accuracy of ¼% or even ½% is quite adequate to convince oneself that the 
disseminated index is wrong. However a ¼% accuracy might not provide enough 
confidence to trade the index futures or arbitrage it against the cash market. 
The initial response of market participants to the wrong Nifty price feed might well 
have been that it would be corrected very soon. As several tens of minutes passed 
without correction, some large participants might have thought of strengthening their 
pre-existing index computation capabilities, performing some quick robustness tests, 
and integrating the enhanced software into their core trading operations. Even if they 
then  set  about  doing  this  in  right  earnest,  they  might  not  have  completed  the 
development  of  trading-room-ready  software
14 before  the  true  Nifty  dissemination 
was restored. 
More importantly, even if every market participant did succeed in calculating the true 
index value with extremely high degree of reliability and confidence, these individual 
computations do not restore the situation that prevailed when there was a true index 
price feed. The key point is that in the presence of a price feed, the index value is 
                                                 
14 The algorithm for the intra day index computation is actually quite trivial – it boils down to 
calculating a weighted average. This is because changes to the base to reflect corporate 
actions are not carried out intra-day. However, on January 18, 2006, the real time index 
dissemination failed at the beginning of the day. Moreover, the special session that had taken 
place before the market open (for the price discovery of the demerged Reliance Industries) 
amounted to a corporate action that had to be accounted for.  
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“common knowledge
15”. Everybody knows that everybody is seeing that same index 
value on the trading screen. 
Even  if  every  participant  succeeded  in  replicating  the  index  computation  on  the 
morning  of  January  18,  2006,  the  index  value  would  not  have  been  common 
knowledge
16. Each participant would have known the index value, but nobody might 
have known that all others knew it as well. Had the disruption lasted several hours or 
several days, then it might gradually have become common knowledge as participants 
talked to each other or as the news media reported the developments. 
It is well known that arbitrage sometimes depends on common knowledge and not 
just  knowledge  by  each  participant  individually.  For  example,  Abreu  and 
Brunnermeier (2002) describe a situation where mispricing is not arbitraged away for 
a long time because “at no point in time is the mispricing common knowledge among 
the arbitrageurs. It might be the case that all arbitrageurs know of the mispricing, and 
all arbitrageurs know that all know that the price is too high or too low, but it is never 
the case that all arbitrageurs know that everybody knows that everybody knows and 
so on ad infinitum.” 
Muniesa, Millo and Callon (2007) rightly argue that “Calculation is … the concrete 
result of social and technical arrangements.” What was seen on January 18, 2006 was 
a failure of part of these technical arrangements. Even if an alternate set of technical 
arrangements were put in place, the market’s “calculation” of the correct futures price 
might have been impeded until the technical arrangements were embedded in a set of 
social arrangements that produced common knowledge of the true index value. 
The  evidence  presented  in  this  paper  of  the  breakdown  of  price  discovery  in  the 
futures markets points to the centrality of “market devices” as argued in actor network 
theory (Muniesa, Millo and Callon, 2007 and Preda, 2006). Well functioning markets 
today  depend  critically  on  a  whole  set  of  information  and  communication 
technologies. Any failures in these material, socio-technical aspects of markets can 
make financial markets quite fragile even if behavioural biases are largely absent. 
                                                 
15 The notion of “common knowledge” was introduced into statistics by Aumann (1976) who 
explained the concept thus: “Call the two people l and 2. When we say that an event is 
‘common knowledge,’ we mean more than just that both 1 and 2 know it; we require also that 
1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that l knows it, l knows that 2 knows that l knows it, and so 
on.” 
16 This argument is also relevant in the more realistic case where many participants succeed in 
computing an approximate value of the true index by using real time prices of a few important 
stocks. Index arbitrageurs who are accustomed to perform cash-futures arbitrage using a 
tracking portfolio consisting of a basket of large and liquid stocks might have found this 
particularly easy to do.  
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